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Abstract 
The intention of this work is to do the mapping of the many problems that critical 
thinking (CT) is confronted with in the inside of law schools, taking these in their 
institutional role as well as tangible manifestations of legal culture. I address the 
significance of CT, reflecting on its philosophical origins and its possibility in our 
time, a time that is marked by a crisis of paradigms. We will move from theory to a 
more pragmatic approach based on skills, only to find different sets of difficulties. 
Today’s higher education institutional learning tradition is characterised by the 
conception and implementation of reforms which, in turn, are dominated by notions 
of business and commercial ethics, that are adding up to the positivist 
predominance that is still reigning upon legal education. 
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Resumen 
Este trabajo pretende realizar una descripción de los numerosos problemas con que 
se encuentra el pensamiento crítico (PC) dentro de las escuelas de derecho, 
entendidas desde su papel institucional pero también como manifestaciones 
tangibles de la cultura legal. Se destaca la importancia del PC, reflexionando sobre 
sus orígenes filosóficos y su posibilidad en el momento actual, marcado por una 
crisis de paradigmas. Después de realizar un análisis teórico, se va a pasar a 
realizar un enfoque más pragmático basado en habilidades, sólo para encontrar 
diferentes tipos de dificultades. La tradición actual de la educación superior 
institucional se caracteriza por la concepción e implementación de reformas que, en 
cambio, están dominadas por nociones de ética empresarial y comercial, que se 
suman al predominio positivista que sigue reinando en la educación jurídica. 
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1. A theoretical frame in context 
CT is considered as a core skill of a transversal nature: a concept which is 
responsible for dealing with a large proportion of the work related to the blending 
between concepts and their implementation (Dauer 1989, Facione 1990, Miller and 
Charles 2009, Schön 1991). Some would argue that the reception of CT in the 
curriculum is only purporting to explain a theoretical principle in a stronger way, 
which in reality does not mean a lot of change in the curriculum or the teacher's 
practice. Embedded in this skills approach, CT is transmuted into critical capacity - 
with more than a few problems to render it operational. The jump from CT to 
critical capacity is immense, it goes without saying, but it is not negative in all 
aspects. Admittedly, the notion is less reverential, more functional and mediated, 
but it is also more explicit and concrete, of a less intellectual stature perhaps, but 
more systematic. Also, it is more accessible to classroom practice. And, of course, 
more measurable, something that is of great importance, for example, in the 
students’ assessment. 
Even so, the theory/practice dichotomy keeps reappearing. Take, for example, the 
notion of “cognitive ability”. In this sense, it can be said that CT is an intellectual 
process inherent in the human race, even an important part of the evolutionary 
resource. On the contrary, the cultural nature and historical contextualization of CT 
is highlighted when we approach this kind of reasoning as a theoretical frame. 
At certain times and in certain cultures, the critical way of thinking seems to have 
prevailed over others: the Greek culture and the Socratic School are both obvious 
examples. They were the ones that gave us the adjective: κριτικός (Kritikos), "able 
to discern." However, our own concept of CT is the result of a very specific 
development. 
What we now understand as CT is a much more concrete and definite way of 
thinking, even more deeply embedded in our Western culture and, at least by 
historical standards, surprisingly recent: its conception derives from the late 
enlightenment period (Waldron 1996, Rose 1984, Goodrich 1993, Douzinas 2005, 
Gearey 2007). It is in this context that Kant set down the foundation of critical 
thinking by trying to answer the question, ‘what can I know?’ His Critique of Pure 
Reason comes to formulate a type of knowledge that begins with experience but 
then exceeds it: an a priori knowledge, independent from experience, which would 
enable us to interpret things, and would come to constitute the form of knowledge. 
Thus, the cognitive ability which we call “critical thinking” sits halfway between 
empiricism and rationalism. As we shall see, this oscillation between the two 
philosophical conceptions still marks the epistemological applications that have 
found their way into the field of education. 
Let us briefly retrace the road of critical reason which Kant defined as judgment, 
thereby providing many a point of contact with legal thought, both metaphorical 
and material and direct: from the prescriptive “what can I know?”, Kant’s critique 
draws the boundaries that should not be crossed if we are to avoid mere 
‘speculation’ (Waldron 1996). 
In his first Critique Kant uses the metaphor of a trial. The judge represents reason 
as consciousness, the use of Roman legal categories by the tribunal of critical 
reason introduces the classical antinomy of law, i. e. ‘the opposition and implication 
between law and fact, morality and legality, autonomy and heteronomy, good will 
and natural desire’ (Rose 1984). 
According to Douzinas (2005), the trial metaphor could be followed all through the 
contemporary Western development of critique. Less than 30 years after Kant, 
Hegel’s notion of intersubjectivity takes its departure from the figure of the judge. 
Nowadays the critic is more like a witness in the court, a court that is now no more 
the tribunal of reason, but of history. And at the turn of the century the last 
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dramatis persona from the trial is finally appearing: the clerk, who is more 
performative than reflective who acts “outside the rule of law, external to the game 
of justice” and whose legislation “is not law but knowledge, his judgment not 
normative but epistemological”. He is represented by Engels’ depiction of the Young 
Hegelians as critics “who considered the object of their intervention external to 
their interpretative practice” (Douzinas 2005, pp. 53-54). 
But our conception of CT is not only linked to particular philosophical developments. 
There is also a historic-political vinculation of this particular way of thinking that is 
clearly linked to the upheaval of liberal revolutions as well as being closely 
associated with the law, with courts and with judgment:  
“In the eighteenth century, history as a whole was unwittingly transformed into a 
sort of legal process…the tribunal of reason, with whose natural members the rising 
elite confidently ranked itself, involved all spheres of activity in varying stages of its 
development. Theology, art, history, the law, the State and politics, eventually 
reason itself – sooner or later all were called upon to answer for themselves” 
(Koselleck 1988, pp. 9-10).  
It is through this particular context that CT developed and still maintains an 
intimate link to a critical agenda (Barcellona, Hart and Muckenbarger 1988, Boon 
1998, Duncanson 1993, Gearey 2007, González 2009, Horkheimer 1995, p. 218). 
There is a third aspect to the issue. The theoretical stance is also linked with the 
process of the constitution of national legal systems in the new European national 
states throughout the 19th century. The obsolescence of this legal scenario is 
nowadays marked by the so-called “legal explosion” (the actual globalized, 
pluricentered, multilevelled, soft law), which would have produced a new law, thus 
a new point of departure to study law, which largely escapes from traditional 
normative approaches and would demand a wholly new theoretical panoplia to 
(scientifically) study law (Berard 2009, Frug 1989, Lista 2002, Morss 2008, Posner 
1987, Zamboni 2007).  
2. Critical agenda and crisis of paradigms 
But is that critical reason still possible/effective today? A pessimistic view on the 
question, certifying, if not the death, at least the “critical condition” of legal 
critique, or at least of the “Critical traditions”, is predominant (Goodrich 1993, 
Douzinas 2005, Gearey 2007). Moreover, the proposition is seriously questioned by 
postcolonial theorists such as Gayatri Spivak (1999) who pursue the way the critical 
tradition envisaged “the other”: this is to say, how Kant foreclosed the difference, 
how Hegel patterned as normative deviation outer European reality, how Marx 
negotiated difference. For these theorists there is not a unique reading of a text or 
of a social situation, but many different readings, and it is this difference that needs 
to be taken into account by every intellectual project. In our time any scientific 
project encounters an epistemological impasse, owing to the crisis of scientific 
paradigms that has come to be called Post-Enlightenment (Barton 1998, Schleifer 
2004). This crisis leads to the difficulty, or even impossibility of defending a critical 
stance, as this would invariably be based on an authoritative concept of reason. 
The application of a critical project to the field of education is specially problematic 
in such a scenario, as it presupposes the concept of progress and of the results of a 
process, here the process of learning. If the reading imposes itself over the text is 
everything, what can be the proof of the learning? The assessment of learning 
comes always from outside, and sometimes doesn’t come at all. In order to 
incorporate a critical stance, we must retrace our steps to the Kantian project, and 
adopt Kant's attempt to widen the gap in the "dogmatic dream", which is marked 
by a kind of equidistance between rationalism and empiricism. If CT must emerge 
in the educational environment it shall be done after suffering a fundamental 
transmutation that reformulates it into “critical competence”. It is this transmuted 
concept that forms the basis for our premises.  
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3. CT as skill: a complex capacity 
The ability to critically analyze any situation, theoretical assumption or body of 
knowledge in order to produce an informed opinion, which is understood and 
recognised as a skill, is a central responsibility for all university studies and 
especially for those related to social sciences and therefore to law. The 
mainstreaming of this skill extends to the heart of the teaching/learning concept, as 
it is based on processes to do with questioning, learning and thinking rather than 
the accumulation of information. This is a complex skill which requires the 
mobilization of a multitude of skills, knowledge and aptitudes. Because of this 
complexity, it is difficult, if not impossible to define.  
To start with, there is not even a unified term: developed by philosophers as part of 
Logic, the term "Critical Thinking" appears next to others such as "Practical Logic", 
"Applied Logic", and since the 1980's also "Informal Logic." Other concepts which 
are closely linked to this are those of discussion and rhetorical thinking, as 
developed by S. E. Toulmin and Chaim Perelman. They argue that a number of 
separate elements can only be established from a cognitive point of view, including 
elements of intellectual and volitional reasoning emerging from a speaker's 
attitude. Cognitive reasoning involves a dual stream of thought: analytical on the 
one hand and evaluative on the other. Hence, they are branched elements of 
analysis and inference, such as interpretation and evaluation. Beyond these 
processes, there is also the consideration of contextual elements. Among the latter 
there may be subjective or attitudinal factors. An attitude which is questioning, 
flexible, open, honest, prudent, and willing to reconsider and clarify issues is key to 
this skill. In terms of concrete actions, one could point to identifying the problem, 
defining the context, analyzing the alternatives, considering the reasons and 
arguments that support each side, evaluating, self-correcting etc. Since the classic 
exposition of John Dewey (1910) How we think the cognitive approach has been 
developed in the direction of a cognitive disintegration (Facione 1990, 2000, Dauer 
1989), and also from the argumentative schools, directly related to the legal field 
(Walton 1987, 2002, 2006, 2008). 
However, even within this cognitive disintegration there is a lack of agreement. The 
weight that is to be given to each element can significantly alter the course and 
nature of the procedures carried out, even more so when taking into account the 
intentional elements, which are subjective by nature, and whose implementation is 
therefore extremely variable (Miller and Charles 2009). From a general point of 
view, neither teachers nor psychologists agree on the abstract processes involved 
in critical reasoning: among teachers of differing knowledge areas, the 
discrepancies are obviously much higher. Given this lack of agreement, CT - the 
reverential treatment that is dedicated to it and the practical difficulties of its 
educational treatment - often appears in pedagogical approaches as a clear case of 
"rhetoric versus reality".  
4. Can you teach being critical? Teaching and assessing the most sublime 
of capacities 
There is not even a consensus from the viewpoint of its transmission: because of its 
complexity, again, the teaching of this kind of reasoning can be approached from 
very diverse perspectives: from a purely cognitive point of view, CT is considered a 
sum of objective procedures, based on the correct evaluation of the premises: a 
defined set of argumentative structures that can be learned and taught. From a 
constructivist perspective, however, CT cannot be decontextualized, since it 
consists of a composite of social practices which are tacitly transmitted and highly 
dependent on context. From the Vygotskian perspective, if CT can be transmitted to 
students, it would only be through a teacher/student relationship, focusing on the 
socialization of the novice, who has to be introduced into the world vision of the 
teacher (Vygotsky 2005, p. 37). The different areas of study oscillate between 
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these different approaches, hardly ever opting completely for either one or the 
other. 
This brings us to the issues related to the daily practice of the law professor: how 
can CT be integrated into everyday teaching? In general, the fact that educational 
innovations are implemented randomly without a deep understanding of their 
function and only to comply with existing regulations is recognized as a clear 
danger of the Bologna Process (Reichert and Tauch 2005, p. 21, Sursock and Smidt 
2010), dangers that are bigger when dealing with a skill so difficult to articulate. Its 
complexity, obviously, makes it difficult in the evaluation of the students’ progress, 
but the real obstacle is to be found in the admiration that academics seem to 
profess for CT: an admiration halfway between obscurity and the sublime, which 
lets appear as correct, or even desirable, the development of non-explicit 
assessment standards that are at the best unspecific. At worst, they constitute the 
perfect place for co-optative operations, oriented towards a practical sense of 
selective affinities: 
“What the operation of co-option transaction must disclose and education should 
transmit or reinforce, in this case, is not just a snippet of knowledge, a collection of 
snippets of scientific knowledge, but a know-how or, more accurately, the art of 
implementing knowledge, and doing it with purpose, in practice, which is 
inseparable from a global point of view, an art of living, a constitution... 
Responsible and respectable member of the elite, inextricably committed to an 
inseparably technical and social role that involves a full set of administrative and 
political responsibilities, the professor of medicine [who previously assimilated that 
of law] often owes his success, at least as much to (?) his cultural capital, his social 
capital, the ties of birth or alliance, and also to provisions such as seriousness, to 
the recognition by teachers and respectability in the conduct of his private life ... 
the docility with regard to disciplines more than schooling ... or even the rhetorical 
skills, which are valued above all as guarantees of adhesion to the social values and 
virtues” (Bourdieu 1984, English ed. 1990, pp. 57 ff). 
At this level of practices, designed evaluation and grading systems are central to 
the teaching/learning process. The difficulty for teachers to assess skills, which by 
definition can only be fully appreciated in their development, is amplified in skills as 
wide and complex as this one. Therefore, one of the first aims of this analysis would 
be to dissect this complexity and define the different skills, and at a lower level the 
abilities and sub-skills that compose them. This dissection would facilitate the link 
to specific categories: a series of indicators to assess and grade the students' 
performance. As it has been noted, the more elements are isolated, the more 
complex – and therefore the better - the teaching practice would be (Maharg 
2007).  
Nevertheless all these operations and indicators are not general, objective and 
interchangeable. They do not constitute a given material from which it could 
develop a general evaluation matrix that serves to structure the processes of 
assessment and grading on the development of critical capacity for every professor, 
in every course. In fact, building a sort of template with unmovable and closed 
categories does not seem to be the best way to take into account the diversity of 
students and the variety of learning achieved in normal university classrooms, as 
the plurality of professorial and academic approaches is a defining feature of higher 
education. 
However, it is also necessary to take control of the need to curb the discretion of 
the teacher in the assessment:  
"Students can, with difficulty, escape the effects of poor teaching, but they can not 
escape (by definition, if they want to graduate) from the effects of a bad 
assessment” (McDonald et al. 1995, p. 8).  
The assessment is, effectively, a central element of the quality of learning 
processes because it conditions their depth and level. 
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The treatment of a complex skill such as CT involves precaution: as teachers as 
well as scientists, we can not forget the dangers of excessive compartmentalization 
and systematization in the assessment of such an important skill, since the way in 
which the evaluation is carried out determines to a large extent the depth of 
learning. An absolute partitioning of CT, understood exclusively as the sum of a 
series of separate provisions and skills, is to destroy a large part of its potential 
(Schön 1991, Burton and McNamara 2009). It is therefore necessary to be aware of 
the limits and compensations of the operationalization of a form of reasoning, which 
relates to a central concern of the faculty regarding educational innovation. 
5. Reasons for the diversity of approaches to CT: the eye of the hurricane 
The diversity of the approaches to CT responds, to a large extent, to the nature and 
historical settings of higher education (Becher and Trowler 2001). It seems 
impossible to agree on anything but the very core of CT: to examine the structure 
of reasoning and understand and evaluate the arguments of production contexts. 
There seems to be no way to go beyond this, precisely because the diversity of 
these contexts prevents it. It is this diversity that makes it impossible to get a 
universal definition of this skill, and it would also be useless to try it. There is no 
sense in a general broad definition of CT, because its importance derives precisely 
from its particular anchor in every sphere of knowledge. The notion of what CT is 
and what its goals are, differs in each discipline. So it can be said that there is no 
sense in “teaching CT” in general, partly because the learning will be minimal. This 
lack of agreement on the definition and mode of transmission of CT goes far beyond 
the inability of professors in different areas to agree on something: CT is in the eye 
of the hurricane of change in higher education, which is definitely departing form 
the university ideal of the pursuit of knowledge per se, and in which CT was 
included in all studies, up to new forms of study that primarily develop technical 
and professional skills (Barnett 1997).  
The transition from a university which is focused on knowledge transfer to another 
that concentrates on skills is key to the crossroads at which institutions find 
themselves in having to define their academic identity in a commercial and 
threatening context. The commodification of education (Thornton 2008) is just a 
part of it. The change in higher education is seen as a sign of decline in the 
autonomy and quality of the work of the university. We have moved from being 
institutions in society, to institutions of society: universities have gone from being 
separate and specialised institutions in society, to being large institutions, central to 
the development of the societies of which they are part. Skills –it is said- can not 
guide our curriculum development, because  
"(…) Skills, however they may be, will continue to be behaviours and capabilities 
that act in particular ways that have been defined by others. In this sense, they 
reduce the authenticity of human action” (Barnett 2001, pp. 121-122).  
Of course, there is a certain elitist perspective in these arguments which for 
example consider that the loss of autonomy entails the “proletarianisation” of 
faculties, which would be subjected to takeovers such as teaching by problems 
(Barnett 2001). However, the underlying problem is still considerable (Cowney and 
Bradney 1996), i. e. that instrumental mentality that encourages learning skills is 
oriented to dominate the reality and not to reflect on it. 
The university community is aware of these risks in the restructuring of studies 
through skills, but it is assuming a passive attitude. Not much information has been 
given to them, nor are they very interested in obtaining it. So, who will benefit from 
this abdication of responsibility on the part of the university community?  
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6. Academic lawyers and professional identity of law schools 
The relationship between legal education and the related professional practice is a 
central concern that we have seen permeating developments so far. One of the loci 
in the field of legal education is that of the dichotomy between academic and 
professional lawyers. Like all dichotomic categories, they are often described as an 
opposition to overcome instituting formulas of communication between them. 
However, the building of these bridges tends to be left to the academy, and their 
content has much of a subordination of academic to professional interests.  
At least in continental Europe it can be said that the successive reforms of higher 
education – including or starring the so-called Bologna process - represent a 
technification of studies, conveyed by a rigid professionalization aimed at better 
preparing university students for their entry into the professional world (often 
synonyms of business, tout court). This is particularly true of legal education.  
The series of binary oppositions (formative / specialized, cultural / professional) 
that can be found in law schools reveal two key aspects: the positivist 
predominance and the doctrinal crisis of academic law. The positivist predominance 
(see below) is of course related to the academic identity crisis arising from the dual 
function of university teachers of law: they are meant to be academics reflecting on 
the coherence of legal knowledge while also being actors within that legal system, 
so that the divide between academic and professional stages in legal education is 
continually reinforced.  
These processes tend to conform a “professional” scenario that is entirely based on 
assumptions regarding the definition of what actually constitutes a “legal 
professional”. The new curricula are to be based on the proof of the academic, 
professional and scientific interest of law studies, and the objectives and skills of 
the enrolling and graduating students, and both sides are to be intertwined. For 
example, if it is assumed that legal studies are directly related to the value of 
justice and the resolution of conflicts, the curriculum is to contain among the skills 
to be demonstrated by students at enrolment certain qualities such as social 
sensitivity, oral and written communication skills. Graduation depends, to a great 
extent, on the contents of previous studies, that is student profiles. Alas, 
professional graduates’ profiles which are adequately compiled and of sufficiently 
high quality are still very scarce, at least in European universities (Olgiati 2005). 
This is certainly the case with regard to Spanish universities. In 2007, when directly 
confronted with the need of providing these data for the production of the new Law 
Grade Report (the White Book), the state agency ANECA itself used the only 
existing reports, that is one from the University Pablo de Olavide de Seville on 
graduate employment in 2001-2003, and another report, initiated in 1996, from the 
University Carlos III of Madrid, "aimed at knowing the reality of work which 
graduates face ... in order to facilitate access to the labour market" (ANECA 2007).  
Of course, graduate skills should meet the needs of the labour market, but as we 
have seen, universities are largely unaware of what these needs are and therefore 
rely largely on hearsay which, in turn, is principally based on the needs of large law 
firms. As we shall see, these processes of substitution and attribution of a 
professional identity have an importance which is crucial for the future of legal 
education, and particularly for the development of any approach to CT in law 
schools. 
The question of how legal knowledge serves to the creation of an identity is a very 
broad one (Barcellona, Hart and Muckenberger 1988, Elkins 1978, Laperrière 1997, 
Strathern 2008). Although there seems to be no conflict on the academic identity to 
be conveyed by legal training, the professional profiles are not as consistent as they 
should be. In fact, at closer inspection many of these professions do not even 
require prior legal training. On the other hand, we must recognize that what 
professional lawyers do, in many cases has little to do with the law as it is 
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understood in academic circles. These traits, if added to the difficulty of 
distinguishing between expert and lay discourse, point to a high level of folk 
categorizations or ideologies in the professional identifications used by law schools 
(Mertz 2007). 
But what is more striking is not the professional profiles per se, but the way in 
which these profiles are marked throughout by a vocabulary that seems to betray 
another set of interests and objectives. One of the more striking examples is the 
use of the term “quality” or “excellence”. These words seem touched by an 
irresistible aura, but when we ask for a definition, criteria become increasingly more 
quantitative, and clearly related to market conceptualizations: the quality of the 
students’ training appears related to customer satisfaction standards (Harvey and 
Green 1993). It is the stakeholders’ approach (Cowney 2010, Collier 2010), 
progressively applied to legal academics and even students. The subordination of 
the academy to certain particular interests that correspond to business and 
commercial ethics is then a process that is becoming more evident every day, and 
is giving form to a professional nomenclature (Toddington 1994) that is proving 
successful. 
The consequences of these identifications for the teaching of law are substantial. 
But they are even greater for the teaching of CT. As long as they primarily 
constitute a folk ideology, law students are banned from questioning such 
established conventions on professions or the role of the legal profession in society, 
as these are closely connected with a certain corporate establishment. There seems 
to exist a direct relation of this with the (non)exposure of students to critiques of 
legal doctrine. The ban of critical reflection on such issues as the professional status 
quo goes further and further in the learning process and extends to the banning of 
questioning prevailing legal doctrine.  
7. The positivist tradition and its impact in legal education through 
propedeutics 
If we are to follow another of the loci of the legal education field, this banning has 
much to do with the positivist tradition and its reception in legal education. In this 
legal education tradition, the law professor does not originate or create any 
argument: he/she does not "give opinions" but only quotes others, so that the 
teacher's job is essentially descriptive. In front of the teacher, a student is not only 
deprived of the skill of criticism, but even of his specific language, his own 
experience. In this paradigm, as Gadamer points out, the learning of law is not 
comprehension, as the subject, alienated from his/her experience, is confined to 
the mere differentiation between several authoritarian significances (Gadamer 
2002). 
Legal language is not only descriptive, it is also prescriptive, and so is the teaching 
of law, as it is dependent on the texts to which the student is exposed: doctrine or 
regulations, their relation with the exercise of power is always certain. So it can be 
said that "teaching law produces professionals who are occupied with telling their 
fellow citizens what to do” (Correas 2000). 
The positivist tradition can also be seen as a device to conceal the ideological 
nature and function of law, and even more so of legal doctrine. This identifies legal 
education as being  
“closer to indoctrination than to education, in the sense that they not only teach 
ideology, but they conceal from the students th ideological nature of the knowledge 
they are learning” (Berard 2009).  
The exclusion of moral and political elements of law in legal education has been 
highlighted (Sarat 2004, Mertz 2007). The vehicle for this tends to be the 
differentiation between “pure” legal contents and “extra”legal elements, thereby 
inducing in the students the view that manipulating the law is morally or politically 
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neutral - a process that has been called a “cynical education” (Economides 1997, 
pp. 26, 29).  
To achieve this exclusion, legal education has traditionally enforced a propedeutic 
approach, a propedeutic tradition. By it I mean the privileged position occupied by 
basic or propedeutic courses taught prior to all others, such as Legal Philosophy, 
History of Law or Sociology of Law in legal studies. This tradition represents an 
apparently amicable but unequal sharing: it relies on a particular division of tasks, 
which allocates to propedeutic courses all the responsibility for an “alternative” 
approach to law while leaving the rest, indeed the vast majority of the positivist or 
doctrinal disciplines unconcerned with this task. Although it seems a quite logical 
and friendly sharing out, the reality is that the price is high, resulting in the 
marginalization of these disciplines in law faculties and a progressive reduction of 
their importance in the curriculum, making them subject to the “outer” forces of 
market and the ever increasing demands of “professionalization”.  
The actual function served by propedeutic disciplines, some of which hold a 
privileged position in law schools curricula, could serve as a reminder for anyone 
who thinks that there are different disciplines: dogmatic and non-dogmatic. As 
Bourdieu has shown, legal academics teaching the propedeutic subjects, 
particularly legal historians, are those most likely to cultivate a specialist field 
discourse, as their main attribute is to maintain the illusion of law as a closed 
autonomous universe (Bourdieu 1986).  
This privileged position has been explained by the weakness of positive law in the 
late nineteenth century when legal curricula were drawn up -a weakness which in 
Spain was still the main characteristic of law curricula during Franco’s era. The 
absence of a political system and a legal ordinance founded on freedom and 
sustained by democracy required a certain conception and teaching of law, full of 
ideologies and other legal doctrines unsupported by any constitutional or 
democratic features (Clavero 2009). More generally, the propedeutic approach has 
been identified as an “external” perspective of legal education: it is the approach of 
the (again) Kantian “should be”, too often translated as the “utopian” “unpractical” 
“idealist” approach, therefore rejectable (Conklin 1993). 
8. Law schools and critical agenda 
Due to these intellectual traditions, and also to their structural characteristics, law 
schools can be seen as a particular island, not only in relation to the university in 
general but even to their own legal culture. Even when the necessity of opening up 
the concept of law is widely acknowledged by legal academics from any field and 
almost any school of thought (Posner 1987), the incorporation of this project into 
teaching and learning activities has as yet failed to occur (Berard 2009).  
As we have seen, legal education research shows evidence that law schools tend to 
resist any change of paradigm, remaining firmly anchored in positivist defence. 
These schools are not only latecomers, but they are historically and structurally 
“pre-illustration” and must remain so to better implement their function as 
providers of a bureaucratic hierarchy (Kennedy 1998). The ideal of the closedness 
of the legal field is still loyally serving this function, a function that is constantly 
revisited and thus confirmed. Indeed, the new demands of professionalization on 
the universities are translated, as we shall see, into a new argument for the 
defence of the positivist approach.  
In this climate, the development of CT does not seem to be one of the most valued 
skills. Neither by professionals dominated by a business ethic in which there is no 
room for CT, nor by legal academics who, as we have seen, only support CT in 
principle but promptly lose any enthusiasm for it when it comes to university 
practice, both for teaching as well as for research. And yet, here we defend its 
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crucial character as a central skill in the law school, the starting-point of active 
reflection on the future of the curriculum and its structure. 
Given the current weak position of the university torn between the two forces, it is 
important not to lose more ground. Law schools must not turn their backs on the 
profession, they must integrate their needs into their curricula while not assuming 
that these needs are just those of the corporate sector. Subjection from the 
academic to the professional is not “the” way to the modernization of studies. It is 
all about maintaining a share of reflection, a place able to accommodate a critical 
capacity in all areas of law. Rather than regarding the notion of skill as something 
related essentially to practice, and therefore not in need of theorisation or even 
reflection, law faculties need to, and on the contrary, apply careful thought, 
promote discussion and debate between the disciplines. 
Open discussion about the skills to be taught at law school is likely to open the 
‘Pandora’s box’ about the concept of law itself, because the discussion of the means 
(skills, strategies, capacity) presupposes an understanding of the purpose they 
serve. And the different positions on the purposes of education are closely aligned 
to a context of openly ideological conflict. One example is the implementation of 
certain general statements, such as those promoting values of tolerance and 
pluralism, by academic bodies which are more concrete and closer to the 
educational act. Academic departments tend to reject the assumption of these 
tasks, with arguments that are openly ideological, they justify them through 
pragmatic criteria. Dewey’s link between education and democracy is not really met 
by academia (Santos 2010). 
9. Legal academic identity and opening up the concept of law 
Given this reality, the skills approach is not sufficient by itself, nor is it possible 
from the outset if it does not imply a less formal and more contextualized concept 
of law. 
The reflection on the skills approach advocates in itself a more fluid concept of law, 
a law based on less categorically closed argumentation and reasoning techniques. 
Of course we know that proposing such a graded aperture goes directly against the 
legal paradigm par excellence: law as an autonomous field, closed and 
independent, which remains the principal foundation of the traditional conceptions 
of law, and also of law teaching. 
One of the characteristics that defines any discipline or field of knowledge is the 
fact that its intellectual framework (the object of research, the conceptual and 
methodological tools that are available and the way they establish the autonomy of 
the field research) tends to be autonomous and self-validating. Consequently, any 
discipline produces the only available validation of its own declarations. One of the 
inherent problems in any attempt to challenge the intellectual hegemony of a 
discipline consists, therefore, in establishing the intellectual space from which to 
undertake such a challenge. Inasmuch as the disciplines are constituted as an 
effect of a way of investigation that is self-validating, it follows that efforts to 
achieve a paradigm shift within a discipline involve challenging not only the 
intellectual foundations of a particular disciplinary tradition, but also the social and 
institutional conditions in which these statements are produced and legitimized 
(Cotterrell 1992). 
In this article we have discussed professional classifications that are appropriate to 
the entire legal field. Affirming the autonomy of law entails a legitimizing discourse 
of professional specificity and an invocation of scientific quality and neutrality on 
the part of this profession. The cultivators of law tend to emphasize autonomy and 
self-referencing in their field, but this image is largely an idealization of their own 
academic and professional identities. Since the texts of Durkheim on the nature and 
development of professions, the relation between the different types of knowledge 
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and professional identity is well known. The sociology of professions has deepened 
in these processes of the construction of prestige from the defence of an exclusive 
area of skills and knowledge as components of their social position (Strathern 2008, 
Schultz and Shaw 2003).  
As a field of study, legal education tries to contrast the paradigm of autonomy of 
law, with a general call for a categorical opening up, in order to keep law schools 
within the university (Maharg 2007), to align their studies to a framework which is 
not so strictly dogmatic and therefore to achieve adapting them into effective 
"teaching skills" whilst not selling schools to the demands of a supposed 
"profession" dominated by strictly commercial criteria. The professor of law should 
teach his/her students a considerable amount of expert technical knowledge, as 
well as the mastering of a specialized language. But it should never make them 
forget that they must also teach their students ways of reasoning, mechanisms and 
attitudes that would allow them to manage such knowledge from a true 
understanding of law in society. 
10. Control on academic skills: the students are at the centre  
Skills are, if anything, directly related to students. The breakthrough of skills in law 
schools was the result of the phasing out of internship and other apprenticeship 
processes, but above all, of an increased social and cultural diversity among 
students. The Langdell era, when professors could expect all students to be 
gentlemen, and when it was also assumed that their professional lives were always 
to be lived among "gentlemen" (Kennedy 2004, Guinier, Fine and Balin 1997), 
therefore making worries about teaching skills redundant, has long passed. Legal 
education is no longer closely related to a code of conduct derived from the 
sameness of social-economic origins shared by all members of the profession. Only 
a homogeneous university - in terms not only of social, economic and cultural 
matters, but also in terms of race and gender-, could assure that all students had 
similarly developed basic skills.  
“Basic skills”, as we understand them and which include CT, are not only 
intellectual practices, such as a proper understanding of written texts and an 
acceptable oral expression, but also other even more basic ones, such as being a 
good listener. The fact that such a simple act is also culturally constructed has 
profound implications for the practice of law teaching (Weisberg and Peters 2007). 
Their social, economic and cultural heterogeneousness is one of the main reasons 
why current students show great differences in the control of those “basic” skills 
(LaPiana 1994, pp. 170 ff, Barnett and DiNapoli 2008).  
We are no longer in a monolithic university. Universities are becoming global, and 
the studentbody’s composition has changed fundamentally. However evident, this is 
never taken into account sufficiently. Pluralism is not, in fact, a value in itself but 
increasingly a reality. Let this reality be incorporated as an attitude of flexibility and 
openness towards a changing and ever demanding concept of citizenship.  
Turning our attention back to the students, to their experiences and foreseen ideas, 
and striving for an open concept of legal education, we find that there are two 
paths that intersect in the search of CT in law schools. From the outset, the 
disciplines that, at least in principle, are considered non-dogmatic, are the ones 
which are the most prepared to develop this approach. However, in my view they 
neither can nor should do it on their own, given the magnitude of change and their 
diminishing weight of influence. The responsibility for these disciplines is to 
dialogue with the dogmatists, to propose multidisciplinary approaches, and to leave 
scholarly ivory towers. 
We have seen again and again how the focus on teaching practice and educational 
planning has to start from theoretical reflection. Legal education offers a field in 
which this critical project can and must be defended. Plus, this field can be the 
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subject of active critique: the exposition of substantial legal actors “in formation”, 
as are the law school students, to legal diversity can have direct effects on the way 
law is conceived and used. By doing so, the field of legal education is in harmony 
with the aspiration of intentional action in the direction of a contribution to civil 
society.  
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